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Steven Palmer 
Central American Encounters with Rockefeller 
Public Health, 1914-1921 
In April 1914, Costa Rica became the first Latin American state to wel-
come to its territory a Rockefeller Foundation program, in this case an 
International Health Commission (IHe) project for the eradication of 
hookworm disease. Over the following two years, anti-hookworm mis-
sions were established in Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and EI Salvador. 
The Rockefeller Foundation, which was created in 1913-1914 as the inter-
national extension of philanthropic work that had originated in the United 
States, chose to initiate operations in these countries and in the British 
Caribbean colonies. According to the foundation's official historian, this 
was because, "like the West Indies, Central America offered opportunity 
for a beginning in which experiments could be tried out on a small scale 
and in a comparatively quiet way." Moreover, she added, "its geographi-
cal position and political relations with the United States gave the Board 
an interest which it felt in no other country." 1 
Ominous imperial imagery: Central America as a secret biomedi-
cal laboratory and undifferentiated zone of geopolitical importance for, 
and close control by, the United States. As it transpired, however, the 
foundation's anti-hookworm program in Central America became many 
programs that varied widely in scope, strategy, and achievement. These 
programs were sometimes appropriated, often partially rejected, and occa-
sionally dismissed by the host societies and governments. What follows is 
an analysis of the reception and transformation of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion's public health mission in Costa Rica, and a preliminary comparison 
of Costa Rica's experience with those of the other Central American re-
publics. 
In 1914 Costa Rica was a tiny country with a population of a mere 
400,000. Its political economy was dangerously reliant on the export of 
coffee and bananas, this latter crop produced in an enclave on the Carib-
bean coast overseen by the United Fruit Company. In geopolitical terms, 
the country was being squeezed by the expanding power of the United 
States: to the south was Panama and the U.S. canal; to the north was re-
cently occupied Nicaragua. Precisely because of these general traits of 
hyperdependency, Costa Rica's is an interesting story about the com-
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plexity and ambiguity of the link between imperial institution and subject 
polity, and about the possibilities for those subject polities to shape their 
own destinies in their inevitable encounters with emissaries from the 
metropole. 
Many scholars of the Rockefeller Foundation's international work have 
forcefully argued that its public health programs mapped and processed 
peoples of the Third World in the service of U.S. imperial expansion, the 
labor needs of agrarian capitalism, and the global hegemony of a style 
of scientific medicine that was finding its modern institutional and com-
mercial form in the United States. If a general view of these programs is 
taken, such a characterization can hardly be disputed. Once the perspec-
tive shifts away from the grand institutional or geopolitical unities of the 
Rockefeller Foundation or the United States of America-and particularly 
if the experience of host countries comes into view-an entirely new set 
of questions and issues is raised about the effect of these public health ven-
tures. What other scholars have taken to be ultimate conclusions about the 
Rockefeller Foundation programs are here bracketed as a given, as a point 
of departure for beginning what I think are more interesting and revealing 
studies on the many ways that these ventures affected political configura-
tions and everyday life in a wide variety of Latin American settings.2 
Instead of focusing on the Rockefeller Foundation itself, then, this essay 
explores the extent to which some Costa Rican individuals, intellectual 
groups, and institutions were able to transform the foundation's venture 
into a vehicle for realizing an already existing public health project of 
local making. It proceeds by calling into question a series of assumptions 
and stereotypes common to the literature on the Rockefeller Foundation 
programs, and on the spread of biomedical public health models in gen-
eral. The essential argument is that, once the anti-hookworm mission was 
successfully established in Costa Rica, it ceased to be reducible to the 
ideological or institutional unity of the Rockefeller Foundation, and was 
reconfigured as a vital component of a local strategy and of an institutional 
matrix designed to advance social medicine; it also became the node of 
a community of public health professionals with desires and allegiances 
that transcended the boundaries of Rockefeller philanthropy, the nation-
state, and the informal empire of the United States. 
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Peripheral Precedence 
Latin America occupies an awkward place in the recent proliferation of 
studies on disease, medicine, and empire.3 Pointing to a dramatic im-
position of alien medical models coincidental with the encroachment of 
British and later US. imperial power is complicated by Latin America's 
prior colonial experience of transculturation. In effect, "Western medi-
cine" was grafted onto American healing traditions from the Conquest 
onward. Scientific medicine and public health, as consolidated in West-
ern Europe and the United States in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, were not in any direct sense arms of the imperial penetration of 
Latin America. Rather, this consolidation was replicated or anticipated by 
political and medical leaders throughout the Americas, and was to some 
extent refashioned to meet their own conditions and needs. Furthermore, 
by the time of the bacteriological revolution and the triumph of profession-
alism, Latin America no longer had any coherent autochthonous systems, 
ancient and customary, capable of waging an epistemological battle with 
Western medicine that might coincide, sometimes self-consciously as in 
the cases of Ayurvedic or Unani medicine in India, with anti-imperialist 
dissent. Though in Latin America scientific medicine and public health 
programs propelled by the germ theory were still largely confined to 
cities, and were accepted by only a thin stratum of society, they were by 
1914 as Latin American as anything else.4 
The Rockefeller Foundation programs in Central America have been 
represented by some scholars as an integral part of an asymmetrical, 
overwhelming imposition of alien medical and public health models. The 
most recent study of the evolution of health care in Costa Rica-rather 
a good one, too, it should be said-proposes the following picture of 
that process: "Two wealthy and powerful US. organizations, the United 
Fruit Company and the Rockefeller Foundation, poured money, equip-
ment, people and technological know-how into Costa Rica. In the process, 
they gradually transformed the health infrastructure and dominant models 
of medical care along the lines of the germ-theory model of disease eti-
ology, using disease-eradication techniques perfected during the Spanish-
American war." 5 
This claim is simply wrong. The error can be illustrated by a brief look 
at the Central American-and particularly the Costa Rican-history of 
research on, and treatment of, hookworm disease. When compared to the 
US. and the Rockefeller experience with the disease, the entire isthmus 
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/661689/9780822396352-009.pdf
by Leddy Library at the University of Windsor user
on 11 March 2021
314 Steven Palmer 
becomes an excellent example of what I have chosen to call "peripheral 
precedence." Hookworm disease had been identified in EI Salvador in 
1887 and in Guatemala in 1889 by a physician of German origin, Helmut 
Prowe. Between 1889 and 1914, four theses had been written on the dis-
ease at the medical schools of EI Salvador and Guatemala. Although Costa 
Rica had less than one hundred physicians at the turn of the century and 
no medical school, it was not without an active nucleus of medical scien-
tists, most of them trained in Western Europe, some in other parts of Latin 
America, and some in the United States. As early as 1896, the patriarch of 
this group (and a former president ofthe republic), Dr. Carlos Duran, along 
with a research colleague, Dr. Gerardo Jimenez, had identified ancylosto-
miasis as endemic to certain regions of Costa Rica. Even physicians in 
the Central American periphery, then, discovered hookworm disease well 
before Charles Wardell Stiles in the United States and Bailey Ashford in 
Puerto Rico made their "American" discoveries of the disease in 1900.6 
Aside from a brief program to treat Salvadoran troops, neither the Sal-
vadoran nor the Guatemalan governments initiated programs to combat 
hookworm disease. In Costa Rica, however, on Duran's urging in 1907, 
the government sponsored a tour by two ambitious young physicians, Luis 
Jimenez and Carlos Alvarado. Their mandate was to determine the extent 
of hookworm infection in the country, and to design a treatment strategy. 
Based on their findings, in 1910 the government approved a not insignifi-
cant annual appropriation equivalent to U.S. $10,000 for the systematic 
testing and treatment of the populace. By 1913, the program was respon-
sible for the treatment of almost 20,000 sufferers annually. The Costa 
Rican program actually predated the first Rockefeller campaign to treat 
hookworm disease in the South of the United States, which began only in 
1909, after Stiles convinced the directors of Rockefeller philanthropy that 
the extent of affliction in the U.S. South warranted their concerted atten-
tion.? 
In Costa Rica, the motives for undertaking this and other programs of 
popular hygiene were broadly similar to those that led the Rockefeller 
Foundation into the crusade against the hookworm. At the most basic 
level, hygiene was yet another realm in which to educate the popular 
classes in fundamental notions of reason and science. The treatment of 
hookworm disease was a particularly good vehicle for this, since there 
was an effective, quick, and relatively simple method of treatment, and 
the rapid relief from an acutely felt illness was an excellent form of 
propaganda. Obviously, a question of political economy was involved: 
hookworm disease, colloquially known as cansancio ("fatigue"), was as-
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sociated with low productivity in workers. This concern, however, was 
merely one element in a broader hygiene project that acquired leverage 
by equating itself with the destiny of the nation, the purity of the race, the 
health of the economy, and the attainment of modernity. 
The state commitment to public health programs, visible from the turn 
of the century onward, was advanced under the curious banner of "auto-
immigration." The country's preeminent groups had long been concerned 
with a historical shortage of labor power. Costa Rica also had extremely 
high levels of infant mortality, due in large measure to amebic dysentery 
and other parasitic afflictions. In the official nationalist rhetoric, Costa 
Rica's Hispanic population had been declared homogeneous, near-white, 
and racially sound. However, public health reformers were motivated by 
a fear that without a therapeutic program to maximize the health of the 
laboring classes, racial degeneration would occur within what they felt 
was the sound (and authentically national) population group, and its "natu-
ral" growth would stagnate. A decadent people would then have to ac-
cept the further immigration of workers from population groups that had 
been pronounced racially degenerate (Afro-Caribbeans, Chinese, Gyp-
sies, Arabs, and South Asians). Thus Cleto Gonzalez Vfquez, a two-time 
president (1906-1910 and 1928-1932), coined the term autoinmigraci6n 
to refer to all public health ventures, because they would maximize the 
endogenous growth of the populace. Juan Bautista Alberdi's famous dic-
tim, "to govern is to populate," had been sublated by eugenic fears: to 
govern was to sanitize.8 
This remained very much a vanguard posture, however, promoted by a 
few influential political figures and a coterie of activist reformers, but re-
sisted by most powerful Costa Ricans as prohibitively expensive and an 
intrusion of the state on domains that should remain private. Of course, 
it also threatened to subordinate physicians to greater state oversight and 
regulation, and the Faculty of Medicine fought or subverted the more am-
bitious public health initiatives. Vociferous resistance also came from the 
Juntas de Caridad, semiautonomous bastions of oligarchic prestige and 
economic power that administered hospitals and public relief. Nonethe-
less, as incipient as these modern public health ventures were in the over-
all scheme of things, they remind us that even in a country as marginal 
as Costa Rica, the Rockefeller Foundation's international public health 
work was in many respects epistemologically, and even programmatically, 
redundant. This, of course, made it relatively compatible with the estab-
lished projects of these vanguard sectors of Costa Rican public power. 
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Imperial Blinders and Local Plans 
The Rockefeller Foundation was hardly an omniscient, well-prepared im-
perial machine. Employees charged with setting up the program knew 
nothing of the Central American discoveries of hookworm disease, and 
they were equally ignorant of the extensive treatment of hookworm dis-
ease in Costa Rica. The foundation's advance man, Joseph White, was 
surprised when Guatemalan and Salvadoran physicians in public health 
posts informed him of the prior research on the disease in their countries, 
though he remained unimpressed by their opinion that ancylostomiasis 
was not a high public health priority. When he arrived in Costa Rica in 
May 1914, White was even more surprised to learn of the treatment cam-
paign there (though it appeared to him self-evident that the campaign 
director, Luis Jimenez, "was by far best fitted to deal with the Commis-
sion, having been educated in Philadelphia"). White was also ignorant of 
the community of medical scientists in the country, and of the alliances 
and divisions that existed among them.9 
This surprising lack of preparation was probably a factor of two things. 
First, the foundation does not appear to have worked closely with U.S. 
consular services, either before or after establishing operations in other 
countries, probably in order to minimize the perception that Rockefeller 
programs were an arm of U.S. foreign policy. Second, advance men like 
White relied to a certain degree on information given to them by local 
agents of the United Fruit Company, who, in his case, were "all personal 
friends" (White was a colonel in the Marine Hospital Service, and many 
United Fruit managers had also served in the Marine Corps). Indeed, in 
Costa Rica he even used the local general manager of the United Fruit 
Company to act as a conduit in extending the official Rockefeller Founda-
tion offer to the country's minister of the interior, though this corporate 
cooperation later foundered, as we will shortly see. The United Fruit 
Company officials do not seem to have had any great insight into local 
public health efforts, perhaps because they had their own medical section 
that mostly confined itself to treating employees in the enclaves.lO 
Costa Rican politicians and public health activists, on the other hand, 
had a fairly good idea of what to expect from the Rockefeller Foundation's 
International Health Commission. Many physicians had been trained in 
the United States and maintained professional contacts there. Indeed, one 
Costa Rican physician and member of the political elite, Juan Ulloa, had 
been on the board of the International Sanitary Bureau of the Union of 
the American Republics since its creation in 1902. The bureau was more 
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a network of information exchange than a programmatic agency, but it al-
lowed delegates to become acquainted with the budding imperial health 
apparatus of the United States (the head of the Sanitary Bureau was the 
surgeon general of the United States). The bureau's 1909 conference was 
held in San Jose, where public health officials from allover Latin America 
met with the local community of activist physicians (Luis Jimenez and 
Carlos Alvarado presented a report on their anti-hookworm work). Costa 
Rican public health activists had had time to observe and to measure this 
colossus, and when the Rockefeller men came calling, they knew whom 
they were dealing with.H 
Moreover, by 1914 anti-imperialist skepticism and resistance had be-
come a significant and even acceptable part of Costa Rican political cul-
ture. The president of the republic at the moment of acceptance of the 
Rockefeller offer was Ricardo Jimenez, who had been widely applauded 
as recently as 1907-1908 for his nationalist denunciations of the United 
Fruit Company. The incoming president, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, would 
reveal himself to be an outspoken critic of the corruption of the political 
class by foreign capitalists, and of laissez-faire in general. He would actu-
ally take steps against both, actions that led to his ouster in the military 
coup of 1917.'2 
Anti-imperialist hostility was hardly discreet. It was one of the first 
things felt by Louis Schapiro, the director of the hookworm mission, on 
arriving in Costa Rica. In justifying to his superiors a decision to omit the 
name of the Rockefeller Foundation from the Departamento de Ankylos-
tomiasis's official stationery, he noted, "I thought, with the feeling against 
the United States in this country, that the work would be better received 
by merely mentioning the International Health Commission in conjunc-
tion with the Government. There is a national suspicion of anything done 
by American Institutes, especially when the work is carried on free." 13 
That the Gonzalez Flores regime came to welcome and to work with the 
Rockefeller mission had a great deal to do with Schapiro himself. It also 
had to do with the credentials of one Costa Rican in particular, Solon 
Nunez, who was appointed by the government to work with the anti-
hookworm department. 
Double Agents and the Republic of Rational Health 
The first man sent down to Costa Rica to direct the anti-hookworm mis-
sion, Henry Carter, had little success cracking the local establishment, one 
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of the reasons that he left for another job after six months. His replacement 
was Louis Schapiro. The son of Polish Jews who had immigrated to the 
United States, Schapiro was hardly the typical "ugly American," despite 
the fact that his background as a physician included service in the mili-
tary and the Coast Guard, and three years as a senior public health official 
in the occupied Philippines from 19IO to 1913. Schapiro had learned to 
speak Spanish quite well and, according to Victor Heiser, who had been 
his superior in the Philippines, had "demonstrated very unusual executive 
ability" and "unusual tact in getting along with all classes of people." For 
two years prior to arriving in Costa Rica, he had worked in the public 
health department of Milwaukee and as a specialist in hygiene and tropi-
cal medicine at Marquette University. Judith Walzer Leavitt has described 
the exceptional success of public health reformers in making Milwaukee 
known, by the second decade of this century, as "the healthiest city" in 
the United States. Schapiro's tenure there followed the brief socialist in-
cumbency in the city council that had consolidated a model of broad com-
munity mobilization in public health. It was the product of a left-liberal 
coalition designed to defeat traditional politicians who had preyed on the 
rapid growth of the city while impeding public health initiatives.14 
Even as Schapiro began organizing the anti-hookworm units in Costa 
Rica, he became intrigued by the possibility of using the public educa-
tion system as the matrix of popular hygiene mobilization. He may have 
been the object of some calculated flattery in this regard. In April, when 
his assistant director, Carlos Pupo Perez, gave a public conference on 
the hookworm for schoolteachers in San Jose and the vicinity, Schapiro 
was enthused by the large turnout of 174 teachers, indicating that school 
inspectors had done a very efficient job of publicizing the event (or of 
suggesting the costs of absenteeism). This was followed soon after by an 
official offer to Schapiro from the president and his brother, the minister 
of education, Luis Felipe Gonzalez Flores, to organize and direct a De-
partment of School Health.ls 
Without consulting his superiors, Schapiro accepted the post, since he 
thought it would "make my position here a great deal stronger, as through 
the Presidential Decree, all official doctors automatically come under the 
control of this office." A bit sheepishly, he insisted that "as soon as they 
can obtain a competent Costa Rican they will do so." On 2 June he con-
cluded a report to the second in command of the IRe, John Ferrell, "I 
am deriving a great deal of personal pleasure and find that my position 
officially has been greatly strengthened by my acceptance of the Director-
ship of the Departamento de Sanidad Escolar." Indeed it had been: on 
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22 May, probably under pressure from the government, the extremely ex-
clusionary Faculty of Medicine of Costa Rica had recognized him as an 
honorary member (his predecessor, Carter, had complained that doctors 
were "a close corporation, and do all they can to keep outsiders out of 
the Country"). Schapiro had impressed the Costa Ricans as approachable, 
competent, and flexible enough to be asked to oversee a local project long 
in the making.'6 
Well before the arrival of the foundation, Costa Rican health reform-
ers had planned to piggyback the system onto the highly successful public 
education network, the cornerstone of the ethical state built by the Liberal 
reformers of the 1880s. In the words of Pupo Perez, words that played on 
the old battle cry of the educational reform, this would inaugurate "the era 
of free and obligatory hygiene." 17 The central obstacle to this was a lack 
of resources, itself the product of a political class not convinced of the 
need to push through the necessary budget appropriations. By mid-1915, 
despite an executive that was singularly disposed to effect this reform, the 
always precarious fiscal situation of the Costa Rican state was becoming 
ever more bleak with the onset of the wartime recession. Schapiro was 
willing to take responsibility for the Rockefeller Foundation filling the 
void and acting as the vehicle for realizing the project. 
Obviously, this hardly made him a Kurtz figure, gone "native" and 
no longer responsive to the imperial program. The large measure of au-
tonomy that the foundation accorded local directors was in no small mea-
sure responsible for the wide variety of Latin American encounters with 
Rockefeller public health. The scope of improvisation granted to a direc-
tor was particularly wide given the "demonstration model" promoted by 
the foundation, whereby technical and institutional frameworks would be 
established in the host country, and then "transplanted" through a grad-
ual transferral of fiscal and administrative responsibility to the host state.IS 
The uses a director made of his autonomy were not likely to be ques-
tioned if they could be justified as necessary for successfully making the 
transplant take root in the host body. They would be questioned even less 
when, as in the case of Schapiro, the paperwork flowed efficiently, and the 
end result was such an obvious fulfillment of the mission's basic mandate. 
Still, it would be rash to discount the degree to which the cultural flexi-
bility of individual directors determined the shape of different missions, 
and Schapiro was obviously more flexible than most in this respect. His 
sensitivity to host cultures was further revealed in the mid-1920s in Siam. 
The Rockefeller Foundation was expelled by the Thai government owing 
to a feeling that the organization was making the country walk down a 
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path its government did not want to tread. They permitted only one agent 
to stay; it was Schapiro who, according to Heiser, had volunteered for the 
"thankless task," and who became "a tremendous favourite in Siam," able 
to engage in ambitious sanitary engineering projects, and to establish a 
series of health centers before he died there of a terminal illness,19 I would 
suggest that we might understand Schapiro as a kind of double agent, ad-
vancing the interests of "imperial medicine," but as far as possible on the 
terms of those sectors of the host country's political class he considered 
progressive. 
Schapiro soon acquired a Costa Rican partner in this double game: So-
lon Nunez, a young physician appointed by the government to be the 
assistant director of the Sanitary Department of Schools in 1916. A year 
later he was appointed the subdirector of the Departamento de Ankylos-
tomiasis by Schapiro. Nunez was the key Costa Rican in the seven-year 
direct Rockefeller involvement, and subsequently became undersecretary 
of public health in 1922, and then secretary of the new Ministry of Pub-
lic Health and Social Protection in 1927. His background is worth some 
comment, since it also brushes against the grain of the stereotypical local 
"collaborator" central to the assumptions of dependency theory and of 
proponents of cultural imperialism. 
Prior to 1913, when he departed to study medicine in Geneva, Nunez 
was a high-profile member of a group of embittered young dissident intel-
lectuals who had dedicated themselves to the cause of anti-imperialism 
and social justice. Often teachers in the country's leading schools, and 
grouped around radical periodicals and cultural centers for workers, this 
loosely affiliated network included many of Costa Rica's most inspired 
leftist intellectuals, like Joaquin Garcia Monge and Carmen Lyra. Nunez 
had been a teacher in two rural schools, and then a school inspector, all 
the while increasing his profile as a critic of dominant society by taking 
an active role in publications like Aurora (1908) and Cultura (1910). His 
19II essay in Renovaci6n, "Jesus y Tostoi," is considered a classic expres-
sion of the romantic anarchist and social Christian vision that animated 
the project of this generation of acratas (disaffected ones).20 
It is unlikely that Nunez had lost his anti-imperialist principles by the 
time he returned from his studies in Switzerland and his apprenticeship 
on the battlefields of France. It was clear to him, however, and to many 
other progressives of the day, that there was a difference between, say, 
the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis and the building of a U.S. canal or 
the annexation of the country. Direct Rockefeller control was designed 
to phase itself out by 1921, whereupon the state would assume complete 
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control over the operations. The basic Rockefeller public health plan was 
quite compatible with that proposed by Costa Rican reformers, particu-
larly given Schapiro's willingness to integrate the mission with the school 
system. The entire project promised a way of circumventing the obstacles 
thrown up by the retrograde elements of the medical and political estab-
lishments, and thus represented a possible shortcut to a centralized appara-
tus of public health that Nunez very much conceived as a socialist advance 
over laissez-faire. A Faustian bargain? Some said so, and Nunez caught his 
share of criticism for devoting himself to the mission. He never hesitated, 
however, and vociferously defended Schapiro on more than one occasion, 
insisting that the foreign physician was a great Costa Rican patriot,21 
Ironically, then, like many of his generation who had nourished them-
selves on the works of the great anarchists, Nunez's energies were now 
turned toward imaginative leadership in expanding the role of the state. 
This was especially the case after 1914, when the young Gonzalez Flores 
brothers opened the doors of state patronage positions to this brilliant 
generation. Its members had a sense that, if they played their cards right, 
they would find themselves at the social controls when the transplant was 
fully integrated into the local system. In many respects, this process was 
similar to the incorporation of progressive intellectuals into state reform-
ism in the United States (and indeed throughout the world) at this time-
proponents of social medicine like Louis Schapiro, for example. 
In an important sense, however, Schapiro and Nunez were "triple 
agents," and their ultimate allegiance was not to an imperial institution, 
a nation-state, an agroexport bourgeoisie, or an embryonic, U.S.-based 
medical-industrial complex. Their bond and their behavior might best be 
understood as the result of a mutual feeling that they were citizens of a 
more transcendent political community: what we will call the "Repub-
lic of Rational Health," a sort of latter-day, specialist analogue of the 
seventeenth-century Republic of Letters. This republic, too, was univer-
salist and devoted to the accumulation of systematic knowledge; its ideal 
was the maximization of human vitality through the application of that 
knowledge. This was a commitment to public health in the full sense of 
the term, since it was not bounded by any institutional borders, nor even 
by the nation-state: it was an identification with humanity as a whole. 
Nunez and Schapiro were pioneers of an international network of pub-
lic health institutions staffed by bureaucrat-intellectuals, very much the 
first generation of the transnational, bureaucratic-intellectual, global elite 
with which we are increasingly familiar (and one that encompasses the 
functionaries of nongovernmental organizations as well). Though both 
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were surely aware that this network had been engendered by the capital 
of robber barons, the imperial dreams of great powers, and the needs of 
commerce and industry-and remained somehow in their service-both 
also knew that the Republic of Rational Health was not reducible to them. 
The international career in social medicine had its own logic, and it was 
propelled by its own desire.22 
The Campaigns 
Both Lynn Morgan and Juan Cesar Garcia propose that the anti-hookworm 
campaigns targeted coffee pickers and plantation workers in Costa Rica, 
and that they were coordinated with the United Fruit Company's medi-
cal apparatus and the coffee oligarchy. In fact, no such direct relationship 
existed between the program's organization and the immediate needs of 
foreign or local agrarian capital. In the first year of operations, for ex-
ample, campaigns were undertaken in extremely isolated peasant commu-
nities in Guanacaste and Puntarenas, and in the public schools in San Jose, 
as well as along the Pacific littoral and in coffee-growing regions of the 
Central Valley. The country was broken down into a grid and systemati-
cally worked through, with the intention to test and, if necessary, to treat 
every individual in the area. Neither the schedule nor the method were de-
termined by the nature of agricultural production in the region, although 
communities could hasten the arrival of the anquilostomiasis unit by peti-
tioning for it and promising assistance up front. As for the United Fruit 
Company, when a hookworm unit inaugurated its campaign in the prov-
ince of Lim6n in June 1915, Schapiro complained to his superiors in New 
York that "the showing by the officials of the United Fruit Company was 
not that of co-operation." Schapiro only made headway in the area after 
meeting the governor and principal officials, the Roman Catholic priest, 
and the British consul to Costa Rica, who called together and secured the 
cooperation of the "colored ministers." 23 
Even had the United Fruit Company been cooperative in the one part of 
the country where it held sway (and which accounted for only a tenth of 
the Costa Rican populace), such complex coalition weaving would have 
been necessary there and elsewhere. Especially in the countryside, the 
anti-hookworm campaign was a kind of guerrilla war between the culture 
of progress and a wide variety of local cultural configurations. The great-
est political resistance came from gamonales loathe to impose the costs 
of latrine building on peasants, lest it lead them to lose influence to rival 
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political bosses. The greatest ideological resistance came from the local 
empirics and curanderos, clearly perceiving the arrival of a previously 
distant rival. Nonetheless, it is probably best to steer clear of romanti-
cizing this resistance as a pure emanation of organic healing traditions 
under the calculated onslaught of imperial biomedicine. Herbal, spiri-
tual, and traditional healers were merely one end of the spectrum of rural 
healers, which included the corner-store owner who carried on a lucrative 
trade prescribing foreign patent medicines for "diseases of the blood," 
the traveling homeopathic salesman, and even, eventually, members of 
the local community who had been hired on as microscopists during the 
campaign. It is also interesting to note that the most valuable allies of 
the anti-hookworm units in the rural areas were primary-school teachers, 
most of them women. This crucial stratum of popular female progressiv-
ism seemed to accept with gusto a mission of hygiene evangelism that led 
them to confront local traditions and power structures.24 
The Department of School Health was formally a section under the di-
rection of the anti-hookworm program. The government provided a bud-
get for a director, part-time physicians, and full-time sanitary assistants, 
these latter recruited from the ranks of female teachers and trained in 
nursing. Because the school health work was so deeply intertwined with 
the propaganda activities of the anti-hookworm program, the foundation's 
resources were also employed to keep it administratively focused, and to 
subsidize its constant work with teachers, which included periodic train-
ing sessions and the supply of literature and classroom materials. As well 
as providing free diagnosis and prescription medicine to poor children, 
the school health section was the first real social work agency in Costa 
Rica, and the sanitary assistants increasingly undertook home visits rather 
than simply school inspections. By 1921, it received a larger portion of the 
total budget of the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis than did the actual 
program for the treatment of hookworm disease.2s 
Nationalism and Sovereignty 
Most accounts of the dynamic between Rockefeller medicine and nation-
alism portray it in negative terms-that is, in terms of the nationalist 
backlashes provoked by the missions in host countries. In a different 
vein, Armando Solorzano has shown that in Veracruz the foundation's 
anti-yellow fever work did a great deal to legitimize the revolutionary 
government of Obregon, and that in its extraordinary collaboration with 
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the socialist government in the Yucatan, it unwittingly paved the way for 
national integration. However, the foundation's work could also have a 
more intimate and complementary role in the production of the national 
community.26 
In 1915, Schapiro offered to make massive quantities of hygiene litera-
ture available to the Ministry of Education. The minister responded by 
setting aside in the curriculum a half hour each week, "the day and the 
time to be uniform throughout the Republic . . . for the instruction of 
pupils from the literature furnished." The image of this simultaneous in-
struction recalls Benedict Anderson's analysis of the nation as a group 
of people anonymous to one another, transformed into a political com-
munity through the simultaneous sharing of identical experiences. The 
vehicle for these rituals need not be of creole fiber, as the employment 
of this imperial literature makes perfectly clear. The material resources 
and scale of the Rockefeller program made possible this concretization 
of nationalist experience throughout the republic. In a more general way, 
as the hygiene program became entrenched throughout the country's pri-
mary school system, the distinction between physical and moral hygiene 
was blurred, and both were linked to national values. Being a good Costa 
Rican became increasingly impossible unless one defecated in a latrine, 
bathed once a day, and underwent scientific examination and purification 
at the hands of the state. The most surreal portrait of this came from 
Nufiez in 1931, when virtually every Costa Rican had been subjected to an 
examination for hookworm disease at least once in his or her life. In ex-
tolling the incorporation of this ritual by the populace, he noted that there 
was "a continuous stream of people to the country's laboratories in search 
of having their feces examined." 27 
As the state had assumed a greater burden of the cost of the Departa-
mento de Ankylostomiasis, and as the department had proven itself to be 
coordinated and effective, a succession of governments had arrogated to it 
more authority over public health matters. On the other hand, the Faculty 
of Medicine and the Superior Council of Public Health, an ad hoc advisory 
body dominated by members of the medical and charity establishments, 
had lost a good deal of public confidence and prestige, especially in the 
wake of a chaotic response to the disastrous influenza pandemic of 1919-
1920, which claimed the lives of over 2,000 Costa Ricans. In 1920, on 
the eve of the Costa Rican state assuming financial responsibility and ad-
ministrative control over the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis, Schapiro 
and Nufiez met with the cabinet of the new Acosta government, which 
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had succeeded the overthrown military dictatorship of the Tinocos. They 
struck a secret deal to transform the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis 
into the Sub secretariat of Hygiene and Public Health, with Nunez at the 
helm. The parties agreed on what legislation would be necessary, since 
it meant suppressing the jurisdiction legally bestowed on the Faculty of 
Medicine. In return, Schapiro guaranteed further Rockefeller support for 
a public health laboratory in San Jose, the training of personnel, and other 
pilot projects. Thus, the moment of greatest Rockefeller subversion of 
Costa Rican sovereignty was also the moment that guaranteed the state 
jurisdiction over a hitherto unconsolidated domain.28 
Central American Comparisons 
My understanding of the anti-hookworm work in Guatemala, Panama, 
Nicaragua, and El Salvador is based on much more cursory evidence than 
my assessment of the Costa Rican program. It is clear, however, that work 
in these other four countries came nowhere near the extent of coverage 
achieved by Rockefeller-sponsored work in Costa Rica, even in absolute 
numerical terms. By 1921, the Costa Rican mission had examined 277,000 
individuals (70 percent of the populace), inspected almost 50,000 homes, 
and overseen the building of 16,000 latrines. In Nicaragua, EI Salva-
dor, and Guatemala, only about 150,000 individuals in each country had 
been examined (25, 8, and 8 percent of the populace respectively), 15,000 
homes had been inspected, and 3,000 privies had been built. The principal 
ingredient for the success of the work in Costa Rica-an extensive public 
education system - was absent elsewhere in Central America. The impor-
tance of this is reflected in the fact that the figures on the use of school 
infrastructure and literacy by the Costa Rican mission dwarf the extent 
of such work carried on by its Central American counterparts. By 1921 
almost 1,000 hygiene lectures for children had been given in Costa Rican 
public schools, less than 200 in Guatemala, and less than 50 in EI Salva-
dor. Almost 300,000 units of literature had been distributed in Costa Rica, 
and less than 70,000 each in Guatemala and EI Salvador, despite the fact 
that their populations were five times greater than that of Costa Rica.29 
Furthermore, the mission directors in the other countries were unable to 
transform their institutions into nuclei of national departments of health. 
Neither was there any sign of strategic alliances between progressive sec-
tors of the local intelligentsia and the Rockefeller missions of the kind so 
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crucial to the Costa Rican encounter. Corresponding to this is a sense that 
the missions were never able to trade in their public image as foreign (and 
thus suspect) entities for a more functional national costume. 
It is striking that the greater the influence of the United States within a 
country, the less successful was the public health work undertaken there 
by the imperial philanthropic institution. Although I have no figures on 
the Panama program, it is clear from reports that the mission was con-
sidered a failure, essentially because there was no local public health 
apparatus with which to work. The US. canal authorities had jurisdiction 
over public health in Colon and Panama City, and their primary efforts 
went toward eradicating yellow fever and maintaining potable water. The 
canal authorities were not interested in anti-hookworm work in rural or 
urban areas, and the Panamanian government was not interested in invest-
ing money or personnel in the Rockefeller project as long as control over 
public health matters was primarily in US. hands.30 
In Nicaragua, the other satellite of the United States, the situation was 
not much better in terms of the insinuation of the mission into the local 
public health apparatus. The second director in particular, Daniel Molloy, 
carried out an ambitious campaign in the most populous parts of the coun-
try, and seems to have had some success in gaining popular acceptance of 
the mission's work, most notably among the indigenous people of Mata-
galpa. Support at the level of government, the medical establishment, or 
social reformers, however, was never forthcoming. The country's historic 
division between the ruling groups of Leon and Granada was reproduced 
at the level of medicine and public health, each city having its own medi-
cal school, and the central government recognizing two national boards of 
health (one from each domain of power). Neither group appeared particu-
larly interested in assisting the anti-hookworm work, nor did the central 
government itself. In fact there is frequent mention of outright sabotage 
of the mission's work by these groups, and of campaigns to ensure that the 
mission be equated with the US. presence in the country.3! 
In Guatemala-and again despite close ties between Manuel Estrada 
Cabrera and the US. government - the mission got a frosty reception from 
El Senor Presidente and the local medical establishment. It also seems to 
have been the most ineptly run foundation project in Central America. 
With almost no government assistance, and with unambitious leadership, 
the anti-hookworm work was confined almost entirely to the agroexport 
plantations of the southern piedmont and coastal plain. Certain large 
planters agreed to assist the mission's work on their properties, and to 
undertake the construction of privies, in an attempt to improve labor out-
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put. Only in EI Salvador did the anti-hookworm program (which did not 
start until 1916) eventually acquire the kind of momentum to suggest that 
it might have eventually rivaled the Costa Rican campaign's coverage. 
Although it is impossible to determine why this was so from the scant in-
formation I have available, it is worth speculating that it corresponds to 
the existence there of a network of positivist reformers who would be-
come visible during the popular political mobilizations of the 1920S.32 
Conclusion 
This brief assessment of the Central American experience with hookworm 
disease and with the Rockefeller Foundation suggests some of the ways 
that rethinking the imperial encounter from a local perspective can upset 
entrenched assumptions. The Central American periphery actually pre-
ceded the U.S. metropole in research on, and treatment of, hookworm dis-
ease. In Costa Rica, this peripheral precedence meant that key sectors of 
the government and public health community were more knowledgeable 
about what the Rockefeller-sponsored hookworm program could offer the 
country than was the foundation itself, and the Costa Ricans appropriated 
the mission accordingly. Paradoxically, while impinging on Costa Rican 
sovereignty in important ways, the foundation's presence strengthened 
and expanded the reach of the Costa Rican state, and provided resources 
and methods that made more profound the sense of nation among the 
people of the country. Finally, a comparison with anti-hookworm work in 
other parts of Central America suggests that there was no positive corre-
lation between direct U.S. geopolitical influence and the realization of the 
Rockefeller Foundation's imperial public health mission. 
The Costa Rican campaign was the only case in Latin America where 
the hookworm work lived up to its original goal of acting as a catalyst for 
creating a centralized state agency of public health. In his 1921 summary 
of the Costa Rican program, Schapiro insisted that "the organization and 
direction of the Department of Medical Inspection of Schools ... was the 
first step to centralize public health agencies towards the formation of the 
National Health Department." That is to say, it was the drastic modifica-
tion of the original Rockefeller plan, one initiated by the Costa Rican state 
and made possible by Schapiro's predisposition and autonomy of action, 
that led to the "success" ofthe mission.33 
There is no doubt that in the anti-hookworm mission the resources and 
prestige of the Rockefeller Foundation were employed to extend the in-
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fluence of the United States, and even to tamper with Costa Rican sover-
eignty. Neither is there any doubt that this was part of an imperial plan to 
expand the network of propaganda for centralized public health systems, 
and to promote the idea of curative medicine alongside a more preventive 
model. My presentation of the program also raises the specter of issues 
that bedevil contemporary Latin America: the transplantation to Cen-
tral America of personnel originally trained as part of Southeast Asian 
counterinsurgency exercises (i.e., the Philippines); and the creation of a 
parallel state, whereby institutions under the direction of U.S. personnel 
are inserted into the state apparatus of the subject country. Even the foun-
dation's planned withdrawal, and its insistence that the host states assume 
the financial burden and direction of the programs, inevitably recalls more 
recent imperial desires of "Vietnarnizing the conflict" and of "winning 
hearts and minds." 34 
Beside these troubling issues, however, is the argument I have presented 
here, that the Costa Rican state was able to meld the anti-hookworm pro-
gram with its own prior public health designs, redirecting the foundation's 
narrowly focused original energies into a hygienicist boost of the public 
education system. In a time of fiscal crisis, the resources of the empire 
were harnessed to expand the sway of the state and to extend Costa Rican 
nationalism among the rural populace. The anti-hookworm commission 
was quite willing to ally itself with some of Costa Rica's leading anti-
imperialists, and the disposition of Louis Schapiro enhanced its ability to 
do so. The funds and personnel of the foundation also helped overwhelm 
influential sectors and institutions of the political, commercial, and medi-
cal establishments who were otherwise opposed to the statist social policy 
then being advocated by a vanguard of public health reformers. 
Notes 
The author would like to thank Marcos Cueto, Ricardo Salvatore, Catherine 
LeGrand, Warwick Anderson, Ivan Molina, and Stuart Schwartz for their assis-
tance in refining this work. The author acknowledges the support of the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and of the Vicerectorfa de 
Investigacion of the Universidad de Costa Rica, which made parts of this paper 
possible. 
1. Catherine Lewerth, "Source Book for a History of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion," vol. 2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives (hereafter RAe), 1949, 4II. 
2. A recent collection on the encounter of the Rockefeller Foundation with 
Latin America, taking the foundation as its principal object of analysis, is Marcos 
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/661689/9780822396352-009.pdf
by Leddy Library at the University of Windsor user
on 11 March 2021
Central American Encounters 329 
Cueto, ed., Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation in Latin America 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, I994). The collection successfully goes 
beyond the often simplistic anti-imperialist, anticapitalist indictments that charac-
terized the work of an earlier generation of students of U.S. philanthropy: in par-
ticular, Edward H. Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller 
Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, I983); and E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller 
Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, I979); for a more recent example, see Soma Hewa, 
"The Hookworm Epidemic on the Plantations in Colonial Sri Lanka," Medical 
History 38, no. I (Jan. I994): I67-83. Two studies that broke the mold through 
more sensitive readings of the philanthropy's activities are Mary Brown Bullock, 
An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical 
College (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, I980); and 
John Ettling, The Germ of Laziness: Rockefeller Philanthropy and Public Health in 
the New South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I98I). 
3. For example, David Arnold's I988 review essay of the state of studies of dis-
ease, medicine, and empire begins with a brief overview of the historiography 
treating Europe and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and 
then explains that "the rest of the world has come increasingly under scrutiny as 
well," listing Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Pacific region, and Austral-
asia, but omitting Latin America. Though he does mention some specific cases 
from Latin America later on, they do not warrant a categorical mention, and the 
collection is without a Latin American case study. "Introduction: Disease, Medi-
cine, and Empire," in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. Arnold 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, I988), I. Studies of Latin America are 
also absent from another important collection on this subject, Roy Macleod and 
Milton Lewis, eds., Disease, Medicine, and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medi-
cine and the Experience of European Expansion (New York: Routledge, I988). 
The fact that the Philippines under U.S. occupation receives attention in both col-
lections underlines the point. 
4. Guenter B. Risse, "Medicine in New Spain," in Medicine in the New World, 
ed. Ronald L. Numbers (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, I987); George 
M. Foster, "On the Origin of Humoral Medicine in Latin America," Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly I, no. 4 (Dec. I987): 364-66; Poonam Bala, "State and 
Indigenous Medicine in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Bengal, I800-I947" 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, I987); and David Arnold, "Smallpox and 
Colonial Medicine in Nineteenth-Century India," Imperial Medicine, 47. 
5. Lynn Morgan, Community Participation in Public Health: The Politics of Pri-
mary Care in Costa Rica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I993), 17-I8. 
This point of view is echoed by Juan Cesar Garcia, Pensamiento social en salud en 
America Latina (Mexico: Interamericana McGraw HilljOrganizaci6n Panameri-
cana de Salud, I994), II2-I3; and by Jorge Cayetano Mora Aguero, Las Jun-
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/661689/9780822396352-009.pdf
by Leddy Library at the University of Windsor user
on 11 March 2021
330 Steven Palmer 
tas Progresistas: Organizacion comunal autonoma costarricense, 1921-1980 (San 
Jose: Editorial PEC91, 1991), 23-24. 
6. On the Central American discoveries, see Solon Nufiez, "La Ankylostomia-
sis," Boletln de la Subsecretarfa de Higiene y Salud Publica I, no. I (May 1923): 
II - IS. Some of the theses are listed in Francisco Asturias, Historia de la medicina 
en Guatemala, 2d ed. (1902; Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 1958), 242-53, 
431-34. On the numbers of physicians in Costa Rica, see Luis DobIes Segreda, 
Indice bibliografico de Costa Rica, vol. 9, Higiene y medicina (San Jose: Imprenta 
Lehmann, 1927-1936; and Asociacion Costarricense de Bibliotecarios, 1967), 
384-402. On Ashford and Stiles, see Ettling, The Germ of Laziness, 29-32. 
7. For Duran's 1907 proposal, see Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica, Policia, 
977. For a summary of the initial Costa Rican campaign, see "Jimenez to White," 
28 May 1914, RAe, Record Group (RG) 5, Series (s) 1.2, box (B) 6, folder (F) 87. 
On Stiles's efforts, see Ettling, The Germ of Laziness, 38-43. The Colombian case 
is an interesting halfway point in this respect, with local physicians identifying the 
disease in 1905 and pressing the government to initiate a dispensary campaign to 
treat laborers in the sugar and coffee sectors, though with limited success (system-
atic Rockefeller Foundation efforts against hookworm began there in 1920). See 
Christopher Abel, "External Philanthropy and Domestic Change in Colombian 
Health Care: The Role of the Rockefeller Foundation, ca. 1920-1950," Hispanic 
American Historical Review 75, no. 3 (1995): 350-51. Julyan G. Peard discusses 
earlier Brazilian efforts to diagnose and treat hookworm in a pioneering article 
on Brazilian social medicine, "Tropical Disorders and the Forging of a Brazil-
ian Medical Identity, 1860-1890," Hispanic American Historical Review 77, no. I 
(1997): 1-44· 
8. Steven Palmer, "Hacia la auto-immigracion: EI nacionalismo oficial en Costa 
Rica (1870-1930)," in Identidades nacionales y estado moderno en Centroamerica, 
ed. Arturo Taracena and Jean Piel (San Jose: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 
1995), 75-85. 
9. On Guatemala, "White to Rose," 7 Apr. 1914; on EI Salvador, "Report from 
Dr. P. A. Villacorta," appended to "White to Rose," 25 May 1914; and on Costa 
Rica, "White to Rose," 25 May 1914; all in RAe, RG 5, s 1.2, B 6, F 86 and F 87. 
10. "White to Rose," 3 June 1914; and "Alvaradez [sic] to White," 14 Apr. 1914; 
in RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 6, F 86 and F 87. 
II. Norman Howard-Jones, The Pan American Health Organization: Origins and 
Evolution (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1981), 8-13. The results of the 
San Jose conference were published as Actas de la Cuarta Conferencia Sanitaria 
Internacional de las Republicas Americanas (Washington, D.C.: Union Panameri-
cana, 1910), but the International Health Commission personnel had not read the 
publication prior to arriving in Central America. 
12. For a complex variety of reasons, the coup was not backed by the United 
States, and the military regime was severely weakened by its failure to receive 
Washington's blessing during its two and a half years of existence. 
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/661689/9780822396352-009.pdf
by Leddy Library at the University of Windsor user
on 11 March 2021
Central American Encounters 331 
13. "Schapiro to Ferrell," 20 Apr. 1915, RAe, RG 5, s 1.2, B 7, F 106. 
14. "Rose to White," 5 Oct. 1914 and 10 Oct. 1914, RAe, RG 5, s 1.2, B 6, F 88; 
Luis Felipe Gonzalez Flores, Historia de la injluencia extranjera en el desenvol-
vimiento educacional y cient(fico de Costa Rica (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 
1976), 160; and Judith Walzer Leavitt, The Healthiest City: Milwaukee and the 
Politics of Health Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
15. "Schapiro to Ferrell," 22 Apr. 1915, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106; and "Luis 
Felipe Gonzalez Flores to Schapiro," 7 May 1915, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106. 
16. "Schapiro to Ferrell," 7 May 1915; "Schapiro to Ferrell," 2 June 1915; and 
"Schapiro to Ferrell," 22 May 1915; all in RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106. See also 
"Carter to Ernst Meyer," 13 July 1914, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 6, F 96. 
17. Carlos Pupo Perez, Nuestras enfermedades evitables: Principios de higiene 
que nadie debe ignorar (San Jose: Imprenta Alsina, 1913),4. 
18. A good overview of the "demonstration model" can be found in Abel, "Ex-
ternal Philanthropy and Domestic Change," 341. 
19. Victor Heiser, An American Doctor's Odyssey (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1936 ),501. 
20. Juan Bautista Frutos Verdesia, Dr. Solon Nunez Frutos (San Jose: Minis-
terio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes, 1979), provides a basic biography and a 
selection of his writings; the importance of his youthful anarchism is discussed 
in Alvaro Quesada Soto, La voz desgarrada: La crisis del discurso o/igdrquico y 
la narrativa costarricense, 1917-1919 (San Jose: Editorial de la Universidad de 
Costa Rica, 1988), 167-68. 
21. For a defense of Schapiro by NUfiez, see Memoria de la Secretaria de Salu-
bridad Publica y Protecci6n Social: 1927 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional' 1928), xi. 
22. My discussion of the Republic of Letters and of its relationship to Kant's 
understanding of the public use of reason comes from Roger Chartier, The Cul-
tural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1991), 24-27. 
23. Morgan, Community Participation, 18-19, 83; and Garcia, Pensamiento so-
cial, II2-13. For a good overview of the manner in which the campaign was under-
taken, see "Informe de la Sub-secretaria de Higiene y Salubridad PUblica," Me-
moria del Ministerio de Gobernacion y Polida: 1923 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional, 
1924), 257-81. See also "Schapiro to Ferrell," 8 July 1915, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, 
F 107. 
24. On the role of teachers, see "Informe del Departamento de Ankylosto-
miasis, 1922," Memoria del Ministerio de Gobernacion y Polida: 1922 (San Jose: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1923), 231-33. 
25. This composite picture of the evolution of the Sanitary Department of 
Schools has been garnered from the annual reports of the Departamento de Anky-
lostomiasis in the Memorias de Gobernacion y Polida, from 1915-1922. The 1921 
budget information is from Dr. F. F. Russell, "Report of Inspection of Costa Rica 
(1921)," RAe, RG 5, S 2, B 41, F 244, 2. For a more detailed look at the links be-
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/661689/9780822396352-009.pdf
by Leddy Library at the University of Windsor user
on 11 March 2021
332 Steven Palmer 
tween public health institutions and other nascent agencies of moral policing, see 
Steven Palmer, "Confinement, Policing, and the Emergence of Social Policy in 
Costa Rica," in The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America: Essays on Crimi-
nology, Prison Reform, and Social Control, 1840-1940, ed. Ricardo Salvatore and 
Carlos Aguirre (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996). 
26. Armando Solorzano, "The Rockefeller Foundation in Revolutionary Mex-
ico: Yellow Fever in Yucatan and Veracruz," in Cueto, Missionaries of Science, 
52-71. An excellent treatment of the ambiguous and unexpected manifestations of 
nationalism in motivating biomedical research in Latin America is Marcos Cueto, 
"Nacionalismo y ciencias medicas en el Peru," Quipu 4, no. 3 (Sept.-Dec. 1987): 
327-55. 
27. "Report of Quarter Ending March 31, 1915," RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106; 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, 2d ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 35-36; and Memoria de Salubridad 
Publica y Proteccion Social, 1931-32 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional, 1932), 9. 
28. Louis Schapiro, "Hookworm Campaign in Costa Rica (1921)," RAe, RG 5, 
S 2, B 28, F 168, 2. 
29. For Costa Rica, see "Informe del Departamento de Ankylostomiasis," Me-
moria de Gobernacion y Polida: 1921 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional, 1922), 269, 
275; for Nicaragua, "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Nicaragua," 
RAe, RG 5, s 2, B 34, F 202, 20-21, 27; for EI Salvador, "Relief and Control of 
Hookworm Disease in Salvador," RAe, RG 5, S 2, B 36, F 218, 12, 19, 21; and for 
Guatemala, "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Guatemala," RAe, RG 
5, S 2, B 31, F 194, 5, 10. 
30. Russell, "Report of Inspection of Costa Rica," 4; and Garcia, Pensamiento 
social, II5. Symptomatic of this is that the hookworm programs receive not a 
single mention in the memoirs of the Canal Zone's chief health officer during this 
period: Winston P. Chamberlain, Twenty-five Years of American Medical Activity 
on the Isthmus of Panama, 1904-1929: A Triumph of Preventive Medicine (Canal 
Zone: Panama Canal Press, 1929). 
31. "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Nicaragua," 32-34; "Report 
to Rose from Managua," RAe, RG 5, S 2, B 34, F 201; and Garcia, Pensamiento 
social, II3. 
32. "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Guatemala"; and "Relief and 
Control of Hookworm Disease in Salvador," 5,23-25. Garcia, Pensamiento social, 
III, notes the existence of a group of state medicine intellectuals in EI Salvador as 
early as the turn of the century. 
33. Schapiro, "Hookworm Campaign in Costa Rica (1921)," 2. 
34. In fact, U.S. medical personnel had even used the term Philippinization to 
characterize their efforts to transfer to Filipinos the public health apparatus that 
was so crucial a part of occupation and counterinsurgency (Warwick Anderson, 
personal communication). 
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/661689/9780822396352-009.pdf
by Leddy Library at the University of Windsor user
on 11 March 2021
